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Abstract
We study the idea that seemingly unrelated behavioral biases can coevolve if they
jointly compensate for the errors that any one of them would give rise to in isolation.
We suggest that the “endowment effect” and the “winner’s curse” could have jointly
survived natural selection together. Next we develop a new family of “hybrid-replicator”
dynamics. We show that under such dynamics, biases survive in the population for a
long period of time even if they only partially compensate for each other and despite
the fact that the rational type’s payoff is strictly larger than the payoffs of all other
types.
Keywords: Endowment Effect, Winner’s Curse, Bounded Rationality, Evolution.
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1 Introduction
The growing field of Behavioral Economics has frequently identified differences between the
canonical model of rational decision making and actual human behavior. These differences,
usually referred to as “anomalies” or “biases,” have been identified through controlled ex-
periments in the laboratory, as well as in field experiments (see, e.g., Kagel & Roth, 1997;
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Harrison & List, 2004). Such behavior is puzzling to economists, who are trained to think
that competitive forces in our society and economy select optimal over suboptimal behavior.
In this paper, we argue that sets of biases may persist because they jointly compensate for
the errors that any one of them would give rise to in isolation. Thus, biases may coevolve as
a “shortcut” solution that leads in specific important environments to behavior that is ap-
proximately optimal.1 While the majority of the existing literature studies behavioral biases
separately, our results suggest that one can gain a better understanding of different behavioral
biases by analyzing their combined effects.
Our paper presents two key contributions. First, we show a relation between the endow-
ment effect and the winner’s curse that indicates that these biases approximately compensate
for each other in barter trade and, therefore, could be the stable outcome of evolutionary dy-
namics. The endowment effect (Thaler, 1980) refers to an individual’s tendency to place a
higher value on a good once he owns it.2 The winner’s curse, or cursedness (Eyster & Rabin,
2005), is the failure of an agent to account for the informational content of other players’
actions. Cursed agents underestimate the effect of adverse selection, and thus, for example,
tend to overbid in common-value auctions and bilateral trade.3 Though they are seemingly
unrelated, we show that both biases may have coevolved together.
Our second key contribution is relevant to the study of relations between any pair of
biases. In a seminal paper, Waldman (1994) shows that a pair of biases can be evolutionarily
stable under sexual inheritance only if the level of each bias is optimal when taking the level
of the other bias as fixed (Waldman calls such pairs “second-best adaptations”).4 Waldman
(1994) studies a setup in which the set of levels of each bias is discrete and sparse, such
that “second-best adaptations” exist. Our example of the winner’s curse and the endowment
effect, however, demonstrates that in various plausible setups the set of feasible biases is
sufficiently dense and the payoff function is concave, and as a result there are no “second-
best adaptations” except for having no biases at all. Therefore, applying Waldman’s results
to such setups does not deliver new predictions beyond that of a standard replicator-dynamics
analysis.
1Cesarini et al. (2012) present experimental evidence suggesting that many common behavioral biases
(and, in particular, loss aversion, which is closely related to the endowment effect) are partially heritable.
2See Kahneman et al. (1991) for a survey on the endowment effect, and Knetsch et al. (2001); Genesove
& Mayer (2001); Bokhari & Geltner (2011); Apicella et al. (2014) for recent experimental evidence.
3See Kagel & Levin (2002, Chapter 1) for a survey on the winner’s curse, and Grosskopf et al. (2007);
Massey & Thaler (2013) for recent experimental support and field evidence. We follow Eyster & Rabin (2005)
in the way we model the extent to which an agent is exposed to the winner’s curse (see Section 2.2), and also
in referring to this extent as “cursedness.”
4For other methodological papers that study stable outcomes in sexual populations in which two traits
co-evolve, see Karlin (1975); Eshel & Feldman (1984); Matessi & Di Pasquale (1996). Bergstrom & Bergstrom
(1999) study the influence of sexual inheritance on parent-offspring conflicts.
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This is where our analysis makes a contribution. We show that some pairs of biases can
persist for relatively long periods of time even when there are no “second-best adaptations.”
Specifically, our results show that starting from any initial state, the population converges to
a state in which agents have both biases and the level of each bias approximately compensates
for the errors of the other bias. Following this convergence, there is a long process in which
the population slowly drifts from having one pair of biases to having another pair in which
the level of each bias is slightly lower. The length of this process (which eventually results
in the population into having no biases) is inversely proportional to the extent to which each
bias compensates for the other bias.5
Model. We demonstrate that the endowment effect and cursedness, while seemingly un-
related biases, compensate for each other in barter-trade interactions of the type that were
common in prehistoric societies.6 In our model, two traders each own a different kind of
indivisible good and consider whether to participate in trade or not. The value of each good
depends on an unobservable property that is known to the owner of the good but not to his
trading partner. The potential gain of the traders also depends on additional conditions that
are known to both players before they engage in trading, but can change from one instance
of trade to another. Goods are exchanged if both traders agree to trade.
Each agent in the population is endowed with a pair of biases. The level of these biases
determines his type, and the agent with a zero level of both biases (i.e., the unbiased one) is
“rational.” The first bias is cursedness, i.e., the extent to which an agent underestimates the
relation between the partner’s agreement to trade and the quality of this partner’s good. In
the trade game, agents in general choose to trade goods that are not very valuable and keep
the valuable goods for themselves. A cursed trader does not pay enough attention to this
fact and overestimates the value of his partner’s good conditional on trade (in the extreme
case, a fully cursed agent simply expects to get a good of ex-ante value). As a result, a more
cursed agent will agree to trade goods with a greater personal value. Thus, cursedness leads
agents to trade too much, and higher cursedness results in more trade.
The second bias is a perception bias, i.e., a function, ψ, that distorts an agent’s subjective
5In addition, we make a technical contribution in extending Waldman’s (1994) analysis from nonstrategic
interactions, in which an agent’s payoff depends only on his own decisions, to strategic interactions in which
an agent’s payoff depends also on the behavior of other agents in the population.
6Evidence from anthropology suggests that trade between groups, based on localization of natural resources
and tribal specializations, was common in primitive societies (see Herskovits, 1952; Polanyi, 1957; Sahlins,
1972; Haviland et al., 2007). Moreover, “[t]he literature on trade in nonliterate societies makes clear that
barter is by far the most prevalent mode of exchange” (Herskovits, 1952, p. 188). Barter trade is not a central
interaction in modern societies, but arguably, the time that has passed since the invention of currency is too
short, in terms of genetic evolution, to eliminate attributes that were helpful for survival in prehistoric times.
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valuation of his own good. If the good is worth x, an agent believes it to be worth ψ (x). If
ψ (x) > x, we say that the agent exhibits the endowment effect, but we allow agents to have
other perception biases as well. An agent with the endowment effect does not agree to trade
goods with low values since he believes those goods to be more valuable than they actually
are and thus he loses profitable transactions.7 Agents with the endowment effect trade too
little, and traders with a higher level of endowment effect trade less.
Results. We analyze the interaction in a large population of traders with different levels
of biases (types). Agents are randomly matched and play the barter game. We assume that
agents do not observe the types of their partners and in each period they best-reply to the
aggregate behavior. Their best reply, however, is distorted by their own biases. We show
that there is a set Γ of types that exhibit both the winner’s curse and the endowment effect,
such that the two biases compensate each other. The set Γ includes not only the rational
type, but also types at all levels of cursedness. Types who are more cursed exhibit a greater
endowment effect.
Our first result (Proposition 1) shows that a distribution of types is a Nash equilibrium
of the population game if and only if its support is a subset of Γ. Moreover, all agents
in the population exhibit the same “as-if rational” behavior on the equilibrium path (their
trading strategy is identical to that of a rational trader), and any type outside Γ achieves a
strictly lower payoff if he invades the population. In a dynamic setting where the payoff of
the barter game determine the agents’ fitness and the frequency of types evolves according to
a payoff-monotone selection (e.g., the replicator dynamics; see Taylor & Jonker, 1978), stable
distributions of types are those with a support in Γ.
We then extend our analysis to the case where fitness is determined not only by the
outcome of barter trade, but is also a result of other activities, in which the biases typically
do not compensate for each other. We assume that while agents interact most of the time in
barter trade, with a small probability p they play other games in which biases lead to strictly
lower payoffs.8 In this setup the rational type has a strict advantage, and as soon as a few
7The fact that traders may have an endowment effect seems at first sight at odds with experiments that
have shown that professionals do not have an endowment effect for goods obtained solely for trade rather
than personal consumption (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1990; List, 2003, 2004; Lindsay, 2011). For example, a
shoemaker will not have an endowment effect for the shoes he makes. This may be related to the fact that
either the shoemaker does not have much value for the goods unless he can sell them or does not see them as
his “endowment” in the first place because they are made for sale. However, manufacturing goods solely for
trade is a feature of the modern world. Though tribes did specialize in specific goods for trade, traded goods
were also consumed by other tribe members (Herskovits, 1952). Thus, there is no contradiction between the
assumption that tribe members developed the endowment effect for their goods in primitive times and the
empirical evidence that professional traders exhibit less of an endowment effect for traded goods.
8In Remark 2 we discuss how small values of p can also be interpreted as cases in which the other activities
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rational “mutant” agents invade the population, the standard replicator dynamics converges
to everyone being rational.9
We show, however, that for various plausible selection dynamics, the above result is no
longer true. We present the family of hybrid-replicator dynamics in which, in contrast to the
replicator dynamics, a newborn agent does not simply replicate the type of an incumbent. In
such dynamics, an agent inherits with some probability each bias from a different incumbent,
and with the remaining probability inherits both biases from a single incumbent. One plau-
sible interpretation of this dynamics is a sexual inheritance where each offspring’s genotype
is a mixture of his parents’ genes. Another interpretation is social learning in which some
agents may learn different strategic aspects from different “mentors.”
The hybrid-replicator dynamics is not payoff-monotone because only a fraction of the
agent’s offspring share his type, while the other offspring have “hybrid” types. Consider for
example a population composed of a single type in Γ, that is, a type where the two biases
compensate for each other. Now assume that this population is invaded by a small group
of “mutant” rational agents. Such agents, by definition, have a higher fitness due to their
advantage in non-barter activities. However, only a fraction of the rational agent’s offspring
are rational and this “dilutes” their relative fitness advantage. The remaining hybrid offspring
have low fitness, because their single bias is not compensated by the other bias in the barter
interaction. As a result, the biased incumbent is stable against unbiased mutants.
First, we use the new dynamic to extend Waldman’s (1994) results to our setup and
shows that only the rational type is stable against all types (Proposition 2). Next, we show
that despite the former result, pairs of biases close to Γ can persist for long periods of time.
Specifically, Proposition 3 shows a relatively quick global convergence to Γ: any type outside
Γ can be eliminated by a “mutant” with the same cursedness level and a perception bias
that is strictly closer to Γ. Moreover, a finite number of invasions by such mutants, which is
independent of the initial state and of the frequency of the additional activities p, will bring
the population very close to Γ.
Our last result (Proposition 4) shows that each type t in Γ is stable against all other
are frequent, but the negative net effect of each bias in these activities is small. In Section 6 we discuss how to
adapt our results to a setup in which players interact each time in slightly different barter-trade interactions.
9In contrast to the assumption here that it is best to be rational, previous literature has suggested that
in some setups each bias may have additional benefits. When biases are at least partially observable, the
endowment effect can be beneficial by inducing credible toughness in bargaining (Heifetz & Segev, 2004; Huck
et al., 2005). The winner’s curse can reduce the risk of creating information cascades e.g., Bernardo & Welch
(2001), show how an evolutionary process can induce agents to underestimate information that is revealed by
the actions of others. In addition, developing fully rational thinking may incur “complexity costs” that are
abstracted away in the model. See also Compte & Postlewaite (2004); Robson & Samuelson (2009) for other
examples of the benefits of biases.
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types, except for a “mutant” type that is very close to t but has slightly lower levels of
each bias. This implies that in a small neighborhood around Γ, the population slowly drifts
toward the rational type. Each step in this drift requires the appearance of a new mutant
with slightly smaller biases, and the length of the sequence of invasions that eventually takes
the population all the way to the rational type is at least O
(
1
p
)
. Thus, for low levels of p,
the population eventually reaches the rational type only after a very long time.10
Related Literature and Contribution. Our paper is related to the “indirect evolutionary
approach” literature (Guth & Yaari, 1992), which deals with the evolution of preferences that
deviate from payoff (or fitness) maximization.11 A main stylized result in this literature (see
Ok & Vega-Redondo, 2001; Dekel et al., 2007) is that biases can be stable only if types
are observable, and so a player can condition his behavior on an opponent’s type.12 By
contrast, we show that even with the “conventional” replicator dynamics, stable states may
contain biased players who play as if they were rational on the equilibrium path (off the
equilibrium path, however, their “mistakes” can be observed).13 Moreover, when considering
hybrid-replicator dynamics, players can also play suboptimally on the equilibrium path.
Our paper is also related to the literature that explains how behavioral biases may evolve.
A majority of these papers deal with a single bias. A few papers have dealt with the possibil-
ity that evolution creates two biases that are significantly different and yet complementary.
Heifetz et al. (2007) develop a general framework in which natural selection may lead to
perception biases, and show that if preferences are observable, then, generically, non-material
preferences are stable. In a non-evolutionary context, Kahneman & Lovallo (1993) suggest
that two biases, namely, excessive risk aversion and the tendency of individuals to consider
decision problems one at a time, partially cancel each other out. Recently, Ely (2011) demon-
strated that in evolutionary processes improvements tend to come in the form of “kludges,”
that is, marginal adaptations that compensate for, but do not eliminate, fundamental design
inefficiencies. Johnson & Fowler (2011) show that overconfidence arises naturally in a setup
10Studies of biological evolutionary processes have discussed population states that are stable only in limited
horizons but not in the “long run,” and have demonstrated that human populations can be found today in
such “quasi-stable” states, even after many thousands of years of evolution (see, e.g., Hammerstein, 1996).One
famous example of this in the human population is sickle cell disease, which occurs when a person has two
mutated alleles. This disease is relatively frequent, especially in areas in which malaria is common, due to
the heterozygote advantage: a person with a single mutated allele has a better resistance to malaria.
11See Remark 1 below for a discussion on extending this literature to dealing with biases.
12A related example is Huck et al. (2005) and Heifetz & Segev (2004) who show that an endowment effect
observed by others can evolve in populations that engage in bargaining, through its use as a “commitment”
device. Herold (2012) assumes serviceability when analyzing the co-evolution of preferences for punishing and
preferences for rewarding. See also Heller (2015) for a related result arising from limited foresight.
13See Sandholm (2001) for a related result in a setup of preference evolution.
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where agents are not fitness-maximizing and use a non-Bayesian decision-making heuristic.
Bénabou & Tirole (2002) show that overconfidence may be optimal when agents have time-
inconsistent preferences. Finally, Herold & Netzer (2015) show that, different biases that
are postulated in prospect theory partially compensate for each other, and Steiner & Stewart
(2016) show that noise in information processing may be mitigated by over-weighting of small
probability events. To the best of our knowledge, the present paper is the first to tie together
the winner’s curse and the endowment effect.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model, which is analyzed in
Section 3. In Section 4 we introduce additional activities and the hybrid-replicator dynamics.
Section 5 presents the main results. We discuss some of our assumptions in Section 6. Section
7 briefly concludes. All proofs appear in the Appendix.
2 Basic Model
We present a model of barter trade, in which a population consists of a continuum of agents
who are randomly matched to engage in a trading interaction. Each agent in the population
is endowed with a type that determines his biases. Agents do not observe the types of their
trading partners. We describe below the different components of the interaction between each
pair, and then proceed to describe the induced population game.
2.1 Barter Interaction
A barter interaction is composed of two agents matched as trading partners. Each agent
i ∈ {1, 2} in the pair owns a different kind of indivisible good, and observes privately the
value of his own good, xi. We assume x1,x2 are continuous, independent, and identically
distributed with full support over [L,H], where 0 < L < H. Let µ ≡ E (xi) be the (ex-ante)
expected value of xi and let µ≤y ≡ E (xi|xi ≤ y) be the expected value of xi given that its
value is at most y.
Both traders receive a public signal α ≥ 1, which is a “surplus coefficient” of trade: the
good owned by agent −i is worth α · x−i to agent i. High α represents better conditions
for trade independently of the quality of the goods. For example, if both parties have a
great need for the commodity they do not own, then α are high. Given that α denotes trade
conditions other than quality, which is represented by x1 and x2, we assume that α, x1, and
x2 are all independent. The coefficient α can have any continuous distribution with support14
14Full support over
[
1, HL
]
implies that for each fixed cursedness level, any two different perception biases
induce different threshold strategies. Without this property our results would not change qualitatively: the
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[
1, H
L
]
. The agents interact by simultaneously declaring whether they are willing to trade.
The goods are exchanged if and only if both agents agree to trade.
2.2 Biases / Types
Each agent has a pair of biases, and their specific levels are denoted by the agent’s type,
t = (χ, ψ). The first bias is cursedness à la Eyster & Rabin (2005). A trader of type
χ ∈ [0, 1] best-replies to a biased belief that the expected value of his partner’s good is
α · (χ · µ+ (1− χ) · µα), where µα is the expected value of his partner’s good when the
partner agrees to trade and the trade coefficient is α. Thus, a cursed trader only partially
takes into account the informational content of the other trader’s action (a rational agent
has χ = 0; a “fully cursed” trader with χ = 1 believes he always gets an “average” object).
Notice that if µα < µ (as we show below), then a χ-cursed trader with χ > 0 overestimates
the quality of his partner’s good.15
The second component, ψ, is a trader’s perception bias regarding his own good. We
assume that ψ ∈ Ψ, where Ψ is the set of continuous and strictly increasing functions from
[L,H] to itself. A trader with perception bias ψ best-replies to a biased belief that his own
good’s value is ψ (x) (rather than x). If ψ (x) > x for all x 6= H we say that the trader
exhibits an endowment effect. Given two perception biases, ψ1 and ψ2, we say that ψ1 is
more biased than ψ2, denoted by ψ1  ψ2, if for all x ∈ [L,H] either ψ1 (x) ≤ ψ2 (x) ≤ x
or ψ1 (x) ≥ ψ2 (x) ≥ x. We write ψ1  ψ2 if ψ1  ψ2 and ψ2 6 ψ1. Letting I ∈ Ψ denote
the identity function, I (x) ≡ x, type (0, I) is the unbiased (or “rational”) type. Denote by
T ≡ [0, 1]×Ψ the set of all types.
2.3 Strategies and Configurations
A general strategy for trader i is a function from α to values of xi for which the trader
agrees to trade. If an agent expects a positive surplus from trading an object of value xi,
then he expects a positive surplus also from trading objects with a value less than xi. Thus,
we can restrict our attention to threshold strategies. An agent’s pure threshold strategy (or
set Γ we define below would include more types, but the observed behavior of these types would be the same.
Finally, the results would be similar if we allowed for smaller or greater α’s, or if we assume full support only
over
[
1, Hµ
]
; however, this would make the notation cumbersome.
15The effect here is similar to the “winner’s curse” in common-value auctions, where cursed agents overbid
because they do not fully take into account the fact that, conditional on winning the auction, other bidders
have lower signals, and thus the expected value of the good is lower than their own signal suggests. This
behavior is observed in experiments (Kagel & Levin, 2002, Chapter 1). See Eyster & Rabin (2005) for further
discussion.
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simply, strategy) is a continuous function s :
[
1, H
L
]
→ [L,H] that determines, for each α,
the maximal value of x for which the agent accepts trade.16 That is, an agent who follows
strategy s accepts trade if and only if x ≤ s (α). Note that xi is continuous and so there is
always a unique best response (see Equation 1 below), and hence the focus on pure strategies
is without loss of generality. Let S denote the set of strategies. We say that a strategy s is
strictly increasing if α > α′ implies that s (α) ≥ s (α′) with equality only if s (α′) = H.
In what follows we assume that the number of types in the population is finite. Specifically,
let ∆ (T ) be the set of type distributions with finite support (we slightly abuse notation and
denote by t degenerate distributions with a single type t). A state of the population, or
“configuration,” is formally defined as follows.
Definition 1. A configuration is a pair (η, b), where η ∈ ∆ (T ) is a distribution of types and
b : supp (η)→ S is a behavior function assigning a strategy to each type.
Observe that the definition implies that an agent does not observe his opponent’s type. He
best-replies while taking into account the value of a random traded good, which is determined
jointly by the distribution of types (biases) in the population and the strategy that each type
uses in the game.17 Given a configuration (η, b), let µα (η, b) be the mean value of a good of
a random trader, conditional on the trader’s agreement to trade when the trade coefficient
is α (formally defined in the Appendix in (5)). Notice that this mean value is determined
jointly by the distribution of types (biases) in the population and the strategy each type
employs in the game. Let s∗t (α) (η, b) denote the best-reply threshold of a trader of type
t = (χ, ψ) who is facing a surplus coefficient α and configuration (η, b). Formally, when
α · (χ · µ+ (1− χ) · µα (η, b)) ≤ ψ (H), then s∗t (α) (η, b) is the unique value in [L,H] that
solves the equation
ψ (s∗t (α) (η, b)) = α · (χ · µ+ (1− χ) · µα (η, b)) . (1)
The interpretation of (1) is as follows. The RHS describes the value of the good a trader
expects to receive from a trade, given his cursedness level χ. The LHS describes the value
the trader attaches to a good of value s∗t (α) (η, b), given his perception bias ψ. A trader
strictly prefers to trade if and only if his good’s perceived value is less than the expected
value of his partner’s good, conditional on this partner agreeing to trade. If the value that
the trader expects to receive from trade is lower than H, then s∗t (α) (η, b) is the unique
threshold for which the trader is indifferent between trading and not trading. When α ·
16Without the mild assumption of continuity in α there may be some Nash equilibria that differ from
elements of Γ only with respect to values of x that do not serve as a threshold for any type.
17In Remark 1 below we discuss how such a best reply may be the result of a simple learning process.
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(χ · µ+ (1− χ) · µα (η, b)) > ψ (H), that is, the expected value of a good obtained by trade
is strictly higher than the perceived value of the owner’s good, then s∗t (α) (η, b) ≡ H (recall
that by definition ψ (H) ≤ H).
We conclude by describing the influence of biases on behavior, as implied by (1):
1. A cursed trader (χ > 0) overestimates the good of his partner and therefore uses a
threshold that is too high (since we deal with threshold strategies µα ≤ µ). That is,
cursed traders trade too much.
2. A trader with an endowment effect (ψ(x) > x) overestimates the quality of his own
good and therefore uses a threshold that is too low and trades too little.
2.4 Equilibrium Configurations and the Population Game
A configuration is an equilibrium if each type best-replies in the manner presented above.
Definition 2 (Equilibrium Configuration). A configuration (η, b) is an equilibrium if for each
type t = (χ, ψ) ∈ supp (η) and for every α ∈
[
1, H
L
]
, b(t)(α) = s∗t (α) (η, b).
Our first result, formally presented below, shows the existence of equilibrium configura-
tions, and that in all equilibrium configurations agents trade more when the surplus coefficient
α is greater. However, there may be more than one equilibrium configuration with the same
underlying distribution. In what follows, therefore, we assume that the equilibrium config-
uration is chosen according the continuous function b∗, i.e., that each population η plays
the equilibrium configuration
(
η, b∗η
)
. The lemma below also shows that such a continuous
function b∗ exists.
Lemma 1 (Existence and Selection of Equilibrium Configurations). For every distribution
of types η ∈ ∆ (T ) , there exists a behavior b such that (η, b) is an equilibrium configura-
tion. Moreover, (1) in any such equilibrium configuration (η, b), the strategy b (t) is strictly
increasing for any type t ∈ supp (η), and (2) there exists a continuous selection function b∗η
that assigns to each type distribution η ∈ ∆ (T ) a behavior such that
(
η, b∗η
)
is an equilibrium
configuration.
One example of b∗ is a function that chooses the equilibrium with maximal trade; but
any continuous function will do. The continuity of the equilibrium selection function b∗ is
required for the payoff function in the population game (Defined below) to be continuous.
Since we assume that for each distribution η a specific equilibrium is played, in what follows
we can focus solely on the distribution of types η.
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The barter-trade interaction together with the equilibrium selection function b∗ define
a population game G0 = (T, u), where T is the set of types (as defined above), and u :
T × ∆ (T ) → [L,H] is a continuous payoff function that describes the expected value of a
good obtained by a type-t agent who best-replies to a trade with a random partner from
configuration
(
η, b∗η
)
; a formal definition of u(t, η) appears in Appendix A.2.
Remark 1 (Learning to Best-Reply). Our notion of population game applies the “indirect
evolutionary approach” of a two-layer evolutionary process: a slower process according to
which the distribution of types evolves, and a faster process according to which agents learn
to “subjectively” best-reply to the aggregate behavior in the population. Most of the existing
literature studies a setup in which types represent subjective preferences (see, e.g., Guth &
Yaari, 1992; Ok & Vega-Redondo, 2001; Dekel et al., 2007). It is reasonable to ask whether
the assumption of subjective best-replying is still appropriate when dealing with behavioral
biases such as cursedness, where agents make “mistakes.”18 That is, one may criticize the
implicit assumption that agents perfectly understand the aggregate biased behavior of other
agents, but then resort to a biased best reply. Observe, however, that the only information
an agent requires for best-replying is an estimator of the expected value of a traded good.
Consider agents who know the unconditional expected value of each good, and observe the
value of traded goods in several past interactions. Given our definitions, non-cursed agents
use the average value of previously traded goods as an estimate of the value of traded goods,
while fully-cursed agents ignore past observations and believe that traded goods have, on
average, the same value as non-traded goods.19 Partially-cursed agents will pay only partial
attention to historical values. Thus, the behavior we describe as a biased self-reply may arise
from plausible “mistakes” in the course of a simple learning process.
3 Compensation of Biases in Barter Trade
In this section we analyze the equilibrium of the population game described above.
18We focus on cursedness since the endowment effect has a natural interpretation as being part of subjective
preferences.
19Idiosyncratic errors due to finite samples do not have any qualitative effect on our results, as they induce
a similar outcome to the random traits discussed in Section 6.
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3.1 Rational and As-If Rational Behavior
As a first step in analyzing G0, consider the case where the entire population is unbiased;
that is, the threshold of each agent is determined by the indifference condition
x∗(α) ≡ s∗(I,0) (α) (I, 0) = min {α · µα(I, 0), H} ,
which is derived by substituting ψ(x) = x and χ = 0 into (1), and using the minimum to
ensure that x∗(α) ≤ H. It is easy to show that if all agents play homogeneously in such a
way, then in a Nash equilibrium the “rational” threshold, denoted by x∗, must be a solution
to the equation
x∗(α) = min
{
α · µ<x∗(α), H
}
.
Next, associate with each χ ∈ [0, 1] the perception bias ψ∗χ ∈ Ψ defined by
ψ∗χ (x) ≡ χ ·
µ
µ≤x
· x+ (1− χ) · x. (2)
Now let Γ =
{(
χ, ψ∗χ
)
: χ ∈ [0, 1]
}
⊂ T be the set of all such types. Observe that: (1)
ψ∗0 (x) ≡ I (thus the rational type (0, I) is in Γ); (2) all other types in Γ are cursed (χ > 0)
and exhibit the endowment effect (ψ∗χ (x) > x for all x < H); and (3) types in Γ who are
more cursed also have a larger endowment effect: χ1 > χ2 implies that ψ∗χ1  ψ∗χ2 .
Assume that the population behaves according to the “rational Nash equilibrium” de-
scribed above, and therefore µα = µ<x∗(α). Then, the threshold chosen by types in Γ is
defined by the equality
χ · µ
µ≤s∗t (α)
· s∗t (α) + (1− χ) · s∗t (α) = α ·
(
χ · µ+ (1− χ) · µ<x∗(α)
)
in the case whereα · (χ · µ+ (1− χ) · µα) ≤ H, and s∗t (α) = H otherwise. That is,
s∗t (α) = min
{
α · µ<x∗(α), H
}
= x∗(α).
In words, when all other agents in the population behave “rationally,” the behavior of types
in Γ is indistinguishable from the rational type. The endowment effect and cursedness com-
pensate for each other, and the
(
χ, ψ∗χ
)
agent behaves (on the equilibrium path) as if he were
rational.
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3.2 Equilibrium and Stability
We now formalize the ideas that were presented informally above. First, let us define a Nash
equilibrium of the population game, as a distribution of types that is a best reply to itself.
Definition 3. Distribution η ∈ ∆ (T ) is a Nash equilibrium in game G0 = (T, u) if u (t, η) ≥
u (t′, η) for all t ∈ supp (η) and t′ ∈ T . It is a strict Nash equilibrium if the inequality is strict
for each t 6= t′.
The following definition ensures that a set of types has two properties: (1) the set is
internally stable since all types have the same payoff (internal equivalence) and (2) the set is
immune to an invasion by a small number of “mutant” types, since those types are outper-
formed by the types in the set (external strictness).
Definition 4. A set of types Y ⊆ T is internally equivalent and externally strict in game
G0 = (T, u) if u (t, η) = u (t′, η) > u
(
tˆ, η
)
for all η ∈ ∆ (Y ), t, t′ ∈ Y , and tˆ ∈ T\Y .
Using these definitions, we can explicitly formulate our first main result:
Proposition 1. A distribution η ∈ ∆ (T ) is a Nash equilibrium of G0 if and only if supp (η) ⊆
Γ. Moreover, Γ is an internally equivalent and externally strict set.
In Appendix A.4 we show that Proposition 1 implies that the set Γ is asymptotically stable
in payoff monotone selection dynamics, such as the replicator dynamics (Taylor & Jonker,
1978).
4 Additional Activities
In this section we first introduce into our basic model additional activities in which biases
have negative impacts, present the “hybrid-replicator dynamics,” and motivate the focus on
homogeneous populations.
4.1 Introducing Additional Activities
The main drawback of the analysis in the previous section is the assumption that fitness is
the result of a single interaction. Obviously, agents engage in many activities that determine
their fitness, and it is reasonable to assume that in some of these activities biases will have
a negative impact on the biased agent’s payoff. For example, in a trade of goods with a
publicly observable quality, or goods with a private value, cursedness is not relevant, and the
endowment effect results in an average loss. In what follows we allow agents to engage in
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additional activities, and assume that in such activities biases are harmful. In this section,
moreover, we show that in this case the rational type has an advantage over all the other
types, including those in Γ. In the next section we show that with some plausible assumptions
on the dynamics, biased types can be stable.
We model the additional activities as follows. With some probability p agents take part
in other activities in which biases are detrimental. Formally, for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, agents play a
population game Gp = (T, up) with a payoff function up : T ×∆ (T )→ [L,H] defined as
up (t, η) = (1− p) · u (t, η) + p · v (t, η) , (3)
where v (t, η), the payoff in other activities, is bias-monotone: larger biases yield lower
payoffs. Formally, for every (χ, ψ) , (χ′, ψ′) ∈ T , and η ∈ ∆ (T ):
χ < χ′ and ψ ≺ ψ′ ⇒ v ((χ′, ψ′) , η) < v ((χ, ψ) , η) .
In addition, we assume that v (t, η) is Lipschitz-continuous.
Remark 2 (Interpreting Small Values of p). Most of our results assume that p is sufficiently
small (i.e., 0 < p  1). In addition to capturing infrequent additional activities, one can
also reinterpret these small values of p as capturing frequent additional activities in which
each bias is (on average) only slightly detrimental. Consider a setup in which there are many
possible non-barter trade interactions. In some of these interactions the biases are payoff-
irrelevant, in others they are beneficial (see the examples discussed in Footnote 9), while in
others they are detrimental. We assume that the net effect of each bias in these additional
activities is negative, but small. For concreteness, assume that the probability of having a
non-barter activity is q and that the order of magnitude of the negative net effect of each
bias is . In this setup, one should interpret p = q ·  as describing both the frequency of the
additional activities and the net effect of each bias in these activities. In particular, small
values of p may correspond to small negative net effects (i.e,   1), rather than to small
frequencies of non-barter activities. Thus, our assumption that p is small reflects the stylized
fact that barter trade was a central interaction in hunter-gatherer societies (as discussed in
Footnote 6), and that the biases had small negative net effects in the non-barter activities.
By definition, in any game Gp the rational type (0, I) has maximal v. In the previous
section we showed that in G0 there are types that behave as if they were rational in some
configurations, but clearly this is not the case for any p > 0. In such cases the rational
type always has an advantage. Therefore, under payoff-monotone dynamics, regardless of the
initial state of the population, as soon as the rational type (0, I) invades the population he
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strictly outperforms all incumbents, and takes over the entire population. Payoff-monotone
dynamics, however, are not the only reasonable type of dynamics to assume. In the following
subsection we introduce a plausible family of non-payoff-monotone dynamics that includes,
among other things, biological heredity.
4.2 Hybrid-Replicator Dynamics
We model the evolutionary selection process in discrete time with each period τ repre-
senting a generation. The dynamics is represented by a deterministic transition function
g : ∆ (T )→ ∆ (T ) describing the distribution of types in the next generation as a function of
the distribution in this generation. The family of hybrid-replicator dynamics is characterized
by a recombination rate r ∈ [0, 1] that describes the probability that each offspring is ran-
domly assigned to two incumbent agents (“parents”) and copies a single trait (in our case, a
bias) from each one of them; under the complementary probability each offspring is assigned
to a single incumbent and copies both of its traits. As in the replicator dynamics, these
random assignments are distributed according to the incumbents’ fitness. Below we provide
a semi-formal description of the transition function. Formal definitions appear in Appendix
A.5.
As is common in the literature, we assume that the expected number of offspring of each
agent is equal to his game payoff plus a positive constant that reflects background factors
that are unrelated to the game. Let fη (t) ∈ R+ be the relative fitness of type t in population
η ∈ ∆ (T ), that is, this agent’s fitness divided by the average fitness in the population. Denote
by η (χ) and η (ψ) the total frequency of types in η with cursedness level χ ∈ [0, 1] and
perception bias ψ ∈ Ψ, respectively. Now let fη (χ) and fη (ψ) be the expected relative fitness
of types in η with cursedness level χ and perception bias ψ, respectively. Thus, η (t) · fη (t)
is the probability of drawing type t from a population η after “reproduction.” Similarly,
η (χ) · fη (χ) and η (ψ) · fη (ψ) are the probabilities of drawing an agent with cursedness level
χ ∈ [0, 1] and perception bias ψ ∈ Ψ, respectively, after reproduction. Thus, the transition
function is defined as follows:
g (η) ((χ, ψ)) = (1− r) · η ((χ, ψ)) · fη ((χ, ψ)) + r · η (χ) · fη (χ) · η (ψ) · fη (ψ) . (4)
The family of hybrid-replicator dynamics extends the standard replicator dynamics (Tay-
lor & Jonker, 1978; reformulated in Weibull, 1997, Chapter 4.1) for which g (η) ((χ, ψ)) =
η ((χ, ψ))·fη ((χ, ψ)) . Observe that a hybrid-replicator dynamics coincides with the replicator
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dynamics if either r = 0 or one of the biases has the same level in the entire population.20
One interpretation of the hybrid-replicator dynamics is biological heredity. If one assumes
that each trait (i.e., bias) is controlled by a different locus (i.e., position in the DNA sequence),
then the probability that each child inherits each trait from a different parent is equal to the
biological recombination rate between these loci. This parameter is equal to 0.5 if the two
loci are in two different chromosomes, and it is strictly between 0 and 0.5 if the two loci
are in different locations in the same chromosome. A hybrid-replicator dynamics is an exact
description of a selection process in a haploid population in which each individual carries one
copy of each chromosome and each trait is controlled by a single locus. At the same time, it is
a stylized description that captures the important relevant properties of a selection process in
a diploid population, like the human population, in which each individual carries two copies
of each chromosome and each trait is controlled by several loci (see, e.g., Maynard Smith
1971; Liberman 1988). One can show that the hybrid-replicator dynamics has the same
implications for asymptotic stability as a more detailed description of diploid populations.21
An additional interpretation is that of a social learning process. The parameter r deter-
mines the frequency of new agents who independently choose two “mentors” and imitate a
single trait of each; each of the remaining new agents chooses a single “mentor” and imitates
both his traits.
4.3 Instability of Heterogeneous Populations
As is common in the literature (see, e.g., Waldman, 1994; Alger & Weibull, 2013), our formal
results in Section 5 focus on studying the stability of homogeneous populations, which include
a single incumbent type, against an invasion by a single mutant type, rather than studying
the stability of heterogeneous distributions against an invasion by heterogeneous groups of
mutant types. The restriction to a single mutant type reflects the assumption that mutants
are rare; it can be relaxed without affecting the results (but it demands more cumbersome
notation and definitions). Thus, in this section where we informally sketch why heterogeneous
populations are not stable in our setup, the restriction to a single incumbent type is motivated.
We begin by demonstrating why a heterogeneous distribution η that includes two types
in Γ (t and t′) is unstable. Observe that the support of a fixed point of a hybrid-replicator
20If all types have the same level of cursedness, χ, then η (χ) = 1, η (ψ) = η ((χ, ψ)), fη (χ) = 1, and
fη (ψ) = fη ((χ, ψ)), which implies that this dynamics coincides with the replicator dynamics. The same
happens when there is a single ψ.
21In particular, assuming that each trait is influenced by a different chromosome and that the “mutant”
type can be “dominant” in both loci yields r = 0.5. Other plausible assumptions (e.g., “recessive” mutants,
and the two loci being in different parts of the same chromosome) yield a value strictly between 0 and 0.5.
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dynamics (with r > 0) must be a product set (i.e., Xη × Ψη), and thus η also includes the
two “hybrid types” that combine a trait from each of these types:
{
t =
(
χ, ψ∗χ
)
, t′ =
(
χ′, ψ∗χ′
)
,
(
χ, ψ∗χ′
)
,
(
χ′, ψ∗χ
)}
.
For simplicity, assume that types t and t′ have the same weight in the population, η (t) = η (t′),
and thus also η
((
χ, ψ∗χ′
))
= η
((
χ′, ψ∗χ
))
. Denote the average cursedness by χ¯ = 0.5·(χ+ χ′).
When p is low, the distribution η is not stable against an external mutant with type t¯ =(
χ¯, ψ∗χ¯
)
. This “average” type outperforms the incumbents because: (1) t¯ has approximately
the same fitness as types t and t′; and (2) the “hybrid siblings” of t¯ that have only one of his
traits,
(
χ¯, ψ∗χ
)
,
(
χ¯, ψ∗χ′
)
,
(
χ, ψ∗χ¯
)
, and
(
χ′, ψ∗χ¯
)
, are substantially closer to Γ and, therefore,
perform better than the hybrid incumbent types
(
χ, ψ∗χ′
)
and
(
χ′, ψ∗χ
)
. (This is because
|χ− χ¯| and |χ′ − χ¯| are less than |χ− χ′|.) Thus, on average, t¯’s “siblings” achieve a higher
payoff in the barter trade. This implies that χ¯ and ψ∗χ¯ have a higher average fitness than
the other biases (i.e., fη (χ¯) > fη (χ) , fη (χ′) and fη
(
ψ¯
)
> fη (ψ) , fη (ψ′)). By (4), a hybrid-
replicator dynamics implies that mutant t¯ succeeds in invading the population (his fitness is
as high as that of the incumbents, and the fitness of each of his traits is strictly higher than
that of the incumbents’ traits).
This argument can be extended to general heterogeneous distributions. Observe that the
payoff of the barter trade is strictly concave in a trader’s thresholds (see part 2 in the proof
of Proposition 1, and assume that trade occurs with positive probability). In addition, the
thresholds of the traders are strictly increasing (decreasing) in the cursedness level (perception
bias). These two observations imply that “intermediate” types use intermediate thresholds;
that is, if each bias of type t is a mixed average of the respective biases of types t1 and t2,
then its threshold strategy is strictly between the threshold strategies of types t1 and t2. If a
heterogeneous population, η, is a fixed point of the dynamics, then different types must use
different thresholds (because the support of the population is a product set, and two types
that differ in only one of the traits must have different threshold strategies). Intuitively, due
to these observations, there is a “mean” type t¯ with biases that are weighted averages of the
incumbents’ biases, such that it uses thresholds that are weighted averages of the incumbents’
thresholds, and a similar property holds for his “hybrid” offspring. (The explicit expression of
t¯ involves technical difficulties and this is why we are only sketching an intuitive argument.)
Finally, due to strict concavity, mutant agents with type t¯ and their “hybrid” offspring achieve,
on average, strictly higher payoffs in the barter trade relative to the incumbents. For a
sufficiently low p, this implies that such mutants can successfully invade the population.
Remark 3. The argument above suggests that in our setup evolutionary forces tend to elim-
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inate heritable heterogeneity, and the population at any given time should be concentrated
around a single type. One can explain heterogeneity in the levels of the observed biases in
the population in a slightly richer version of our model in which each bias is partially her-
itable and its realized level depends also on random type-independent factors. For further
discussion see the beginning of Section 6 below.
5 Main Results
This section studies how biases change over time under the hybrid-replicator dynamics.
5.1 Only the Rational Type is Asymptotically Stable
In a seminal paper, Waldman (1994) characterizes dynamically stable types under sexual
inheritance. In this subsection we apply his characterization to the current setup and show
that only the rational type is asymptotically stable.
We begin by defining asymptotic stability. Suppose that a population composed of only
type-t agents is invaded by a small group of mutants of type t′. If the population (1) does
not move far away from its pre-entry state, and (2) converges back to t, we say that type t is
asymptotically stable against type t′ . Type t is asymptotically stable if it is asymptotically
stable against all types. Formally, let gτ (η) be the induced distribution of type-τ generations
after an initial distribution η (i.e, g2 (η) = g (g (η)), etc.).
Definition 5. Type t ∈ T is asymptotically stable against type t′ ∈ T if for every λ ∈ (0, 1)
there exists  such that for every ′ ∈ (0, ):
1. (Lyapunov stability) gτ (′ · t′ + (1− ′) · t) (t) > 1− λ for every τ ∈ N; and
2. limτ→∞gτ (′ · t′ + (1− ′) · t) = t.
Type t is a single-bias Nash equilibrium if no other type that differs in a single trait is a
best reply against t. Formally,
Definition 6. Type t = (χ, ψ) ∈ T is a single-bias Nash equilibrium in game Gp = (T, up) if
up (t, t) ≥ up (t′, t) for all t′ = (χ′, ψ′) ∈ T such that χ = χ′ or ψ = ψ′.
Observe that any type that is a Nash equilibrium (see Def. 3) is also a single-bias Nash
equilibrium. Waldman (1994) deals with a simpler setup without strategic interactions, in
which the type’s payoff is independent of the population. In this setup: (1) a single-bias
Nash equilibrium is interpreted as a second-best adaptation, which optimizes the type’s payoff
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under the constraint that only one of the biases can be changed with respect to the incumbent
type t, and (2) a Nash equilibrium is interpreted as first-best adaptation, which optimizes the
type’s payoff without constraints. Waldman (1994, Prop. 2) shows that being a single-
bias Nash equilibrium is a necessary condition for asymptotic stability. Prop. 2 adapts
Waldman’s (1994) analysis to the current strategic setup and shows that for any sufficiently
small p > 0, the rational type is (1) the unique single-bias Nash equilibrium, and (2) the
unique asymptotically stable type.
Proposition 2. Let t 6= (0, I) ∈ T . There exists p¯ > 0 such that for any p ∈ (0, p¯): (1)
type t is not a single-bias Nash equilibrium, and (2) type t is not asymptotically stable. By
contrast, type (0, I) is a strict Nash equilibrium and asymptotically stable for any p ∈ [0, 1].
Sketch of proof. (full proof appears in the Appendix)
1. We deal with two separate cases:
(a) t = (χ, ψ) /∈ Γ: The two biases of type t do not cancel each other in the barter
interaction, and thus, type t does not choose the optimal threshold against itself.
This implies that there exists type t′ = (χ, ψ′) that differs from t only in the per-
ception bias, and that the bias ψ′ induces type t′ to choose the optimal thresholds
against a population of agents of type t. This implies that u0 (t′, t) > u0 (t, t), and
the same inequality holds for up for a sufficiently small p. Thus type t is not a
single-bias Nash equilibrium. As observed in Section 4.2, in a population where all
agents have the same level of cursedness, the hybrid-replicator dynamics is payoff
monotone, and thus mutants of type t′ outperform incumbents of type t, which
implies that type t is not asymptotically stable.
(b) t = (χ, ψ) ∈ Γ \ {(0, I)}: Consider a mutant type t′ = (χ′, ψ) with the same
perception bias and a slightly lower level of cursedness χ′ = χ − . Agents of
type t′ choose slightly different thresholds than agents of type t do (specifically,
the former tend to trade a bit less). By a standard “envelope theorem” argument,
these slightly different thresholds have only a second-order effect on the agent’s
payoff in the barter trade (because type t’s thresholds are optimal). By contrast,
the slightly lower level of cursedness induces a positive first-order effect on the
payoff in the additional activities. This implies that for any p > 0, if  is sufficiently
small, then up (t′, t) > up (t, t). This shows that type t is not a single-bias Nash
equilibrium, and by the same argument as in Case (A), it is not asymptotically
stable.
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2. As noted above, the rational type always does strictly better than any other type, i.e.,
up ((I, 0) , ·) > up (t′, ·). That is, the rational type is a strict Nash equilibrium for any
p > 0. Consider any mutant type t′ = (χ′, ψ′) with a small mass of  that invades a
population of (I, 0)-agents. Almost all (1− O ()) of the agents with cursedness 0 also
have perception bias I (and vice versa), and these rational agents achieve a strictly
higher payoff than agents who have either cursedness χ′ or bias ψ′. This implies that
the frequency of cursedness 0 and perception I converge to one, which shows that (I, 0)
is asymptotically stable.
Waldman (1994) shows that a single-bias Nash equilibrium is necessary for stability under
sexual inheritance (and it is sufficient if it induces a payoff that is not too low). Waldman
(1994) applies this result to a setup with a finite set of feasible types {(χ1, ψ1) , ..., (χN , ψN)},
in which many biased types are single-bias Nash equilibria. A biased type (ψi, χi) in which the
two traits only partially compensate for each other is a single-bias Nash equilibrium because
the set of feasible types is sufficiently sparse, such that no other ψj better compensates for
χi (and, similarly, no other χj better compensates for ψi).
However, if the set of types is a continuum and the payoff function is concave, as in our
setup, then only the rational type is a single-bias Nash equilibrium, and thus it is the unique
asymptotically stable type.22 As long as the payoff function is concave, this is also the case
in an environment with a finite but sufficiently dense set of types. For example, consider a
setup similar to ours except that the set of feasible types is discretized and ∆ is the distance
between any two neighboring types. If p  ∆, then types sufficiently close to Γ will be
single-bias Nash equilibria, that is will outperform any “single-bias” mutant who is different
in one of the biases.. This is because the mutant’s disadvantage in best-replying in the barter
interactions will outweigh any advantage the mutant might have in non-barter interactions.
However, if ∆  p, then any type in (or near) Γ is unstable against nearby “single-bias”
mutants with a slightly lower level of one bias. Arguably, in a biological setup in which the
set of feasible values that can be encoded by the chromosomes is very large, the latter case
may be plausible even for small values of p.
22As noted by Waldman (1994, page 488), if the set of feasible types is convex, and if the payoff function
is concave (as in our setup), the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the set of single-bias Nash equilibria.
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5.2 Global Fast Convergence to Γ and Slow Drift within Γ
The previous subsection applied an analysis à la Waldman (1994) and showed that only the
rational type is asymptotically stable. In this subsection we present a novel analysis that goes
beyond Waldman (1994) and shows (1) fast convergence to a small neighborhood around Γ
from any initial type, and (2) the stability of the types in Γ against all types except for those
that are close neighbors to Γ and have slightly smaller biases.
We begin by defining the L1-norm to measure distance between types (the same results
can be achieved by other standard norms, such as the L2-norm). Formally, let the distance
between two perception biases ψ, ψ′ and the distance between two types t = (χ, ψ) , t′ =
(χ′, ψ′) be defined as follows:
‖ψ − ψ′‖ =
∫ H
L
|ψ (x)− ψ′ (x)| dx, ‖t− t′‖ = |χ− χ′|+ ‖ψ − ψ′‖ .
Let ‖t‖ = ‖t− (0, I)‖ be the distance between t and the rational type. For a set of types
T˜ ⊆ T and a type t′ let
∥∥∥T˜ − t′∥∥∥ = inft∈T˜ ‖t− t′‖ . Finally, given type t ∈ T , let tΓ ∈ Γ be
the type in Γ with the same level of cursedness as t.
For any δ > 0, let Γδ = {t ∈ T | ‖Γ− t‖ ≤ δ} be the set of types that are δ-close to Γ.
In what follows we show our first main result: for any type t /∈ Γδ there is a mutant type
t′ strictly closer to Γδ that eliminates type t, i.e.; any initial population that includes both
types converges to a population in which all agents have type t′. Moreover, there is a uniform
bound n = n (δ), such that at most n sequential invasions can take the population from any
initial state to Γδ. Formally:
Definition 7. Type t′ ∈ T eliminates t ∈ T if ∀  ∈ (0, 1): limτ→∞gτ ( · t′ + (1− ) · t) = t′.
Proposition 3. For each δ > 0, there exists  = O (δ) > 0 and p¯ > 0, such that for each
type t /∈ Γδ, there exists type t′ such that: (1) type t′ eliminates t for any p ∈ (0, p¯) and any
r ∈ [0, 1], and (2) ‖tΓ − t′‖ < ‖tΓ − t‖−. This implies that there is a sequence of finite types
(t0 = t, t1, ..., tn) of length n ≤ 1 that is independent of p, such that each type ti+1 eliminates
type ti, and type tn is δ close to Γ, i.e., tn ∈ Γδ.
The sketch of the proof is similar to part 1 (a) of Prop. 2. It relies on the elimination
of any type t /∈ Γδ by a type t′ with the same level of cursedness as t, and a perception bias
that induces type t′ to choose the optimal thresholds against a population of agents of type
t.23 Observe that the upper bound on the number of sequential invasions that are required to
23Observe that Γ contains types with all possible levels of χ ∈ [0, 1] (see Equation 2). Thus, we can establish
a convergence to Γ from any type t using mutants that differ only in their perception bias (which gets closer
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converge to Γδ (namely, 1 ) is independent of p (for any sufficiently small p) and is independent
of the initial type.
Next, we show that any type t ∈ Γδ is stable against all types that are not in its -
neighborhood (with  = O (p)). This implies that the minimal length of a sequence of
invasions, taking the population from type t ∈ Γδ to the rational type (0, I) , is at least
‖t‖

, and in particular, this minimal length converges to infinity as p converges to zero. The
second part of the result shows that types in its -neighborhood with slightly smaller biases,
eliminate type t. Formally:
Proposition 4. Fix r > 0. For each p¯ > 0, there is  = O (p¯) such that:
1. there is δ¯ > 0 such that for any p ∈ (0, p¯) each type t = (χ, ψ) ∈ Γδ¯ is asymptotically
stable against every other type t′ = (χ′, ψ′) satisfying |χ′ − χ| , ‖ψ − ψ′‖ > ; this implies
that the minimal length of a sequence (t0 = t, t1, ..., tn = (I, 0)) such that each type ti+1
eliminates type ti, must satisfy that n ≥ ‖t‖ = ‖t‖ · Ω
(
1
p¯
)
.
2. for any p ∈ (0, p¯), there is δ > 0 such that each type t = (χ, ψ) ∈ Γδ \ {(0, I)} can be
eliminated by a type t′ satisfying ‖t− t′‖ <  and ‖t‖ −  < ‖t′‖ < ‖t‖.
Sketch of proof.
1. Type t ∈ Γδ makes almost optimal decisions in the barter trade. For any mutant t′
that is sufficiently far away from t, either t′ itself, or its hybrid offspring (that inherits
one bias from t′ and one bias from t), chooses thresholds that are substantially different
from the almost optimal thresholds of type t. This implies that the advantage of the
incumbent type in the barter trade is substantial, and that it outweighs any possible
loss in the additional activities for a sufficiently small p, which implies the asymptotic
stability of type t′.
2. The sketch of the proof is similar to part 1 (b) of Prop. 2.
5.3 Summary of Results
Combining our results, we conclude that for a sufficiently small p > 0 the population dynamics
satisfies the following properties:
to ψχ for a given χ). The space of perception biases is much richer, however, and one cannot (in general)
converge to Γ by having mutants that differ only in their level of cursedness: types with ψ(x) 6∈ {ψχ} are not
in Γ.
22
1. Homogeneity of the population: the informal argument in Section 4.3 suggests that any
heterogeneous population converges to a homogeneous population as soon as a mutant
type with biases close to the population’s average type appears.
2. Global convergence to Γ (Prop. 3): any type far from Γ can be eliminated by types
closer to Γ. Moreover, a finite sequence of invasions can take the population to be very
close to Γ, and the bound on the length of this sequence is independent of p.
3. “Punctuated” stability of types in Γ (Prop. 4 – part 1): each type t close to Γ is
asymptotically stable against all types except for those that are very close to t and have
slightly smaller biases. This implies that each biased type close enough to Γ can survive
as a unique incumbent type for a substantial period of time, and once it is eliminated,
it will be replaced by a nearby slightly less biased type.
4. Slow drift toward (0, I): the population slowly drifts toward (0, I) in a small neighbor-
hood around Γ (Prop. 4 – part 2 + “this implies” of part 1). Each step in this drift
requires the appearance of a new mutant with slightly smaller biases, and the length
of the sequence of invasions that eventually take the population all the way to (0, I) is
Ω
(
1
p
)
.
6 Discussion
Random Traits and Empirical Predictions For simplicity, we have described agents
with a particular type as having the same cursedness level and the same perception bias.
However, the results remain qualitatively the same in an extended model in which the biases
are only partially heritable, that is, if the cursedness level and the perception bias that an
agent of type (χ, ψ) exhibits are χ+ χ and ψ+ ψ, respectively, where χ and ψ are random
factors unrelated to the agent’s type and are independent of each other.
In Section 4.3 we concluded that evolutionary forces tend to eliminate heterogeneity, and
the population at almost any given time should be concentrated around a single type in, or
very close to, Γ. Thus, in this extended model, any observable heterogeneity within a given
population should be the result of random non-heritable variations of the biases described in
the previous paragraph. This leads to two empirical predictions, which allow, in principle,
to test the extended model. First, the model predicts that, in a given population, there will
be no correlation between the levels of the two biases. Second, the extended model predicts
that on average these biases will approximately compensate for each other in barter-trade
interactions, which were typical in the evolutionary history. It may also be argued that
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different sub-populations that started from different initial conditions have not yet had time
to mix completely. Such sub-populations are expected to be at different states in Γ and
thus have heterogeneous average levels of the two biases. If one can compare between such
sub-populations, then the third prediction of this extended model is to see a strong positive
correlation between the average cursedness level and the average endowment effect across
sub-populations. Obviously, empirical research is needed in order to confirm or falsify these
predictions, and such a process may be complicated.
Richer Environments The model described in Section 4.1 can capture (with slight mod-
ifications) an environment in which agents randomly engage in one of many barter-trade
interactions that are relatively similar to each other (rather than playing one game with high
probability and a completely different activity with low probability, as illustrated in Section
4). For concreteness, consider the following example. Assume that each period traders’ pri-
vate signals are drawn from a different distribution. The distribution is chosen i.i.d. each
period according to a log-normal random variable νσ ∼ lnN (0, σ2). Given νσ, the private
value of each trader is distributed according to the CDF Fνσ (x) =
(
x−L
H−L
)νσ . Both agents
publicly observe the realization of νσ before they decide whether or not to trade (the case
in which νσ is unobservable is equivalent to playing a fixed barter trade). This environment
can be embedded in our model. Define the function u as the payoff function in the barter
trade when the distribution of private signals is F0 (x) = x−LH−L , and define the function v (σ)
as the difference between the expected payoff (with respect to νσ) of the game with Fνσ (x),
and u. The expected payoff in such an environment can be written as uσ = u+ v (σ) . Note
that the standard deviation σ replaces p as the magnitude of the perturbation in the model.
Observe that: (1) the function uσ (t, η) describes the expected payoff of type t in population
η in this environment; (2) v (σ) ∼ O (σ) for a sufficiently small σ; and (3) function v (σ) (t, η)
is Lipschitz continuous and bias monotone. Due to these observations, all our stability results
can be extended to this setup in a relatively straightforward way when σ is sufficiently small.
This example can be generalized to any family of ex-ante distributions of private values, as
long as the variance among these distributions is sufficiently small.
Different Ways to Capture the Biases Our qualitative results are robust to the exact
way in which the two biases are captured in the model. One can capture cursedness by
following a different approach than Eyster & Rabin (2005) (e.g., by adopting the “analogy
based expectation equilibrium” approach, as in Jehiel, 2005; Jehiel & Koessler, 2008). Since
we allow a large set of perception bias functions, we can find a set of types for which the biases
fully compensate each other also for this alternative representation of cursedness. One can
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claim that not every perception bias function is plausible, because biased individuals behave
in a “simple” manner (for example, one can claim that ψ’s must be linear). However, even
for a large class of restricted sets of perception bias functions, where the two biases cannot
fully compensate for each other, the results of Section 4 continue to hold. This is due to the
fact that under the hybrid-replicator dynamics biases survive for long times even if they only
approximately compensate for each other.
Different Barter-Trade Mechanisms Our results remain qualitatively similar to other
variants of barter with indivisible goods, such as having interdependent values instead of
common values, or having a different surplus coefficient for each trader. One can also consider
trade with divisible goods in which the relative price of exchange between the commodities is
endogenously determined by haggling. Such trading mechanisms turn out to be analytically
intractable (though numeric analysis suggests that similar results may hold in such a setup).
The analysis can be rendered tractable by assuming that the price is determined by a noisy
double auction: if the buyer’s price is lower than the seller’s price no trade occurs, whereas
if it is higher then the probability of trade is increasing linearly in the difference between the
two bids, and the price is the mean of the two bids. In this specific setup the results remain
qualitatively similar.
7 Conclusion
This paper explores the possibility that several biases coevolve together if they approximately
compensate for each other errors, and thus lead to behavior that is “close” to a fitness
maximizing (“rational”) behavior. By focusing on barter trade, an activity of significant
importance in prehistoric times, we have specifically suggested that the Endowment Effect
and Winner’s Curse (Cursedness) may have coevolved. We have also shown that even when
biases lead to fitness that is strictly lower than the fitness of rational types, biases can
survive for a long time, as long as the evolutionary dynamic is non-monotone. Our main
methodological innovation is to show that this is true even when there are no pairs of biases
that are “second-best adaptations” (i.e., there exist no pairs of biases in which the the level
of each bias is optimal when taking the level of the other bias as fixed). We hope our results
can be used in the future to deepen the understanding of the evolution of behavioral biases.
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A Technical Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1 (Existence of Equilibrium Configurations)
Denote by F the absolutely continuous cumulative distribution function of xi. The explicit
formula for the expected value of the partner’s good conditional on his agreement to trade ,
µα (η, b), is
µα (η, b) =
∑
t∈supp(η) η (t) · F (b (t) (α)) · µ≤b(t)(α)∑
t∈supp(η) η (t) · F (b (t) (α))
, (5)
and if the denominator equals 0 (i.e., no agent ever agrees to trade given coefficient α), let
µα (η, β) = L.
Let {ti = (χi, ψi)}i≤n be the finite set of types in population η (n is the arbitrary number
of types). Substituting (5) into (1), configuration (η, b) is an equilibrium if and only if for
each type i ≤ n, whenever α · (χi · µ+ (1− χi)µα (η, b)) ≤ ψi (H),
ψi (b (ti) (Foreachr,  > 0, thereisp¯ = O (min (, r))α)) = α · (χi · µ+ (1− χi) · µα (η, b)) ,
(6)
and b (ti) (α) = H otherwise.
Fix any α ∈
[
1, H
L
]
. Let xi = b (ti) (α) and ηi = η (ti). Then (6) is reduced to the following
set of n equations:
∀i ≤ n ψi (xi) = α
(
χi · µ+ (1− χi) ·
∑
j≤n ηj · F (xj) · µ≤xj∑
j≤n ηj · F (xj)
)
. (7)
For each i ≤ n, let gi,α : [L, µ] → [L, α · µ] be a function that assigns the threshold of an
agent of type ti to any expected value of an object that is traded in population, v. Formally:
gi,α (v) =
ψ
−1
i (α · (χi · µ+ (1− χi) · v)) α · (χi · µ+ (1− χi) · v) ≤ ψi (H)
H α · (χi · µ+ (1− χi) · v) > ψi (H) .
(8)
Notice that in equilibrium xi = b (ti) (α) = gi,α (µα (η, b)). Now let hη : [L, α · µ]n → [L, µ] be
the function that assigns the expected value of an object that is traded in a population η to
a profile of thresholds (x1, ..., xn)that are used in that population. Formally:
hη (x1, ..., xn) =
∑
j≤n ηj · F (xj) · µ≤xj∑
j≤n ηj · F (xj)
.
Notice that µα (η, b) = hη [b (t1) (α) , ..., b (tn) (α)]. Finally, let f : [L, µ] → [L, µ] be defined
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as follows:
fα (v) = hη (g1,α (v) , ..., gn,α (v)) .
Observe that any solution to the equation v = fα (v) induces thresholds that can be used as
part of an equilibrium when the coefficient surplus is equal to α; that is, v = µα (η, b) and
b (ti) (α) = gi,α (v). Similarly, any equilibrium configuration (η, b) induces a solution to the
equation v = fα (v) for all values of α. We now show that there is at least one solution for
v = fα(v). First observe that since we assume that F and ψ are continuous functions then
g, h, and f are continuous functions. Second, notice that for each α ∈
[
1, H
L
]
fα (L) ≥ L and
fα (µ) ≤ µ. Thus fα(v) = v at some v ∈ [L, µ].
Next, we have to show that there exists a continuous function v∗ :
[
1, H
L
]
→ [L,H] such
that for each α ∈
[
1, H
L
]
, we get24 fα(v∗ (α)) = v∗ (α). Let v∗ (α) be the largest fixed point
of fα (i.e, for each α, we get v∗ (α) = arg maxv∈[1,HL ] fα(v) = v). The fact that ψ
−1 and h
are continuous and increasing functions as well as the linear dependency in α in Equation (8)
imply (1) the continuity of v∗ (α) with respect to α, and (2) the continuity of v∗ (α) (η) with
respect to the distribution of types η,.
Note that the above v∗ (α) is the function that selects the equilibria with maximal trade.
All of our results remain the same if one chooses a different continuous function v∗ (α) , such
as the one that selects the smallest fixed point of fα (and minimizes the probability of trade).
Finally, we have to show that in any equilibrium configuration (η, b) each strategy b (t) is
strictly increasing in α for each type t ∈ supp (η). We prove it by the following steps:
1. Substituting α = H
L
into (6) implies that the RHS is weakly larger than H, which
implies that b (t)
(
H
L
)
= H for any type t ∈ supp (η) in any equilibrium configuration.
2. The function µα (η, b) is a strictly increasing function of α in any equilibrium config-
uration. Otherwise, due to the continuity of the strategies b (ti) and the fact that
b (ti)
(
H
L
)
= H, there is α < α′, such that µα (η, b) = µα′ (η, b). Eq. (6) and the
monotonicity of each ψi imply that (b (ti) (α)) < (b (ti) (α′)). Together with the equal-
ity µα (η, b) = hη [b (t1) (α) , ..., b (tn) (α)], the former inequality implies that µα (η, b) <
µα′ (η, b), a contradiction.
3. Because (i) the functions µα (η, b) and gi,α (v) are strictly increasing in α, and (ii) the
functions ψi (x) are strictly increasing, then b (ti) is strictly increasing in α.
24We have to show the continuity of v∗ (α) in order to have all types using a continuous threshold strategy
as a function of a surplus coefficient (as assumed in the definition of a strategy in Section 2.3).
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A.2 Formal Definition of the Payoff Function of G0
In this section we explicitly state the payoff of each type in the population game G0. Let
u (s1, s2|α, x1, x2) be trader 1’s payoff when his signal is x1 and he plays s1, while his partner,
trader 2, has a signal x2 and plays s2; and when the public signal is α:
u0 (s1, s2|α, x1, x2) =
α · x2 x1 ≤ s1 (α) and x2 ≤ s2 (α)x1 otherwise. .
Now, let u (s1, s2) be the expected payoff of an agent with strategy s1 who faces a partner
with strategy s2, where the expectation is taken w.r.t. the values of of the signals x1,x2, and
α:
u (s1, s2) =
∫ H/µ
α=1
∫ H
x1=L
∫ H
x2=L
u0 (s1, s2|α, x1, x2) dFx2 dFx1 dFα,
where Fj is the CDF of random variable i ∈ {α,x1,x2}. Finally, given type t ∈ T and
an equilibrium configuration (η, b∗(η)), define u (t, η) as the expected payoff of a type-t ∈ T
agent who faces an opponent randomly selected from population η:
u (t, η) =
∑
t′∈supp(η)
η (t′) · u [s∗t (α) (η, b∗(η)) , b∗(η) (t′)] .
Note that the definition is well defined also for types outside the support of η (i.e., for types
t ∈ T\supp (Γ)).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1 (Characterization of Equilibria in G0)
The proof includes the following parts:
1. Definitions and notations:
(a) Probability of trade: let q (α|η) be the probability that a random partner from
population η agrees to trade given α. Note, that q (α|η) > 0 iff ∃t ∈ supp (η) with
b∗η (t) (α) > L.
(b) Expected payoff of a threshold strategy: let u (x, α|η) be the expected payoff of
a player who uses threshold x, and faces a distribution of types η (which plays
according to b∗η), conditional on the surplus coefficient being α.
(c) Incumbents: the types in the support of a given distribution η.
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(d) A type’s threshold strategy: for each type t = (χ, ψ) let strategy s∗t (α|η) be the
threshold strategy of a type t who faces population η; that is, for each α ∈
[
1, H
L
]
,
s∗t (α|η) is the unique solution to the equation:
ψ (s∗t (α|η)) = min
{
α ·
(
χ · µ+ (1− χ) · µα
(
η, b∗η
))
, H
}
.
(e) Mean threshold: For each α ∈
[
1, H
L
]
and distribution of types η ∈ ∆ (T ) , let
x¯ (α|η) be the unique solution to the equation: µ≤x¯(α|η) = µα (η); that is, for a
given α, the mean value of a traded good in a homogeneous population where
all agents use threshold x¯ (α|η) is equal to the mean value of a traded good in
population η (where all agents play equilibrium strategies).
2. The expected payoff of a threshold is given by the following formula:
u (x, α|η) = u (α · µα, α|η)−q (α|η)·|F (x)− F (α · µα)|·E (|y − α · µα| | y ∈ [α · µα, x]) ,
(9)
where, with a slight abuse of notation, [α · µα, x] = [x, α · µα] if x < α ·µα. The optimal
threshold, which induces the maximal payoff, is x = α · µα because it results in trade iff
the trader’s good is worth less than the expected value of a trading partner. Using a dif-
ferent threshold x yields a wrong decision with probability q (α|η) · |F (x)− F (α · µα)|.
Conditional on making a wrong decision and the partner’s agreement to trade, the
expected loss from trade is equal to E (|y − α · µα| | y ∈ [α · µα, x]) (the expected dif-
ference between the value of the trader’s good and the conditional expected value of his
partner). Observe that u (x, α|η) is concave w.r.t. x, and strictly concave if q (α|η) > 0.
3. The previous step immediately implies that type (0, I) (who always chooses the optimal
threshold of α · µα) weakly outperforms any other type (i.e., u ((0, I) , η) ≥ u (t, η) for
each t ∈ T and η ∈ ∆ (T )), and strictly outperforms any other type if there is any α
such that q (α|η) > 0 and x 6= α · µα.
4. The “if” side. Let η ∈ ∆ (T ) be a Nash equilibrium of G0. We prove that supp (η) ∈ Γ.
(a) In any Nash equilibrium all types use the optimal thresholds for all α’s; that is,
∀t ∈ supp (η) and α ∈
[
1, H
L
]
b∗η (t) (α) = α · µα (η).
Assume to the contrary that there is at least one value of α for which one of the
incumbent types uses a non-optimal threshold. This set of α’s is defined as
Aα =
{
α | ∃t0 ∈ supp (η) s.t. b∗η (t0) (α) 6= α · µα (η)
}
.
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By part 3 and the continuity of the threshold strategies, an incumbent type in a
Nash equilibrium distribution can use a non-optimal threshold in α only if q (α|η) =
0.
Let α¯ be the supremum of Aα. Consider first the case where α¯ = HL . In such a
case, the assumptions that each ψ is strictly increasing and ψ (H) ≤ H imply that
ψ (x) < H for each x < H, and therefore q (α|η) > 0 for α’s sufficiently close to
H
L
, and u ((0, I) , η) > u (t, η) for some type t ∈ supp (η).
Now consider the case where α¯ < H
L
. All types play the rational threshold for
α > α¯, and by continuity of b∗η (t) (α) all agents play the rational threshold at α¯.
Observe that the rational thresholds are always strictly larger than L, and this
implies that q (α|η) > 0 for each α ≥ α¯. By continuity of b∗η (t) (α), there exists an
interval of α’s such that α < α¯, q (α|η) > 0, and α ∈ Aα, and this implies that η
cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
(b) If there exists t0 = (χ0, ψ0) ∈ T\Γ in supp (η), then there exists an α such that type
t0 does not use the optimal threshold; i.e., ∃α0 ∈
[
1, H
L
]
b∗η (t0) (α) 6= α · µα (η) .
Assume to the contrary that for each α ∈
[
1, H
L
]
, all incumbents t ∈ supp (η)
use the “optimal” threshold b∗η (t) (α) = x∗(α) ≡ min {α · µα, H}. In the next
argument, we focus on the interval of α in which x∗(α) is determined by the
indifference condition (1). It is easy to see that such values always exist for types
who trade optimally. For these levels of α, we obtain
ψ0 (α · µα) = α · (χ0 · µ+ (1− χ0) · µα) .
The fact that all players use the optimal thresholds implies that µα = µ≤x∗(α), and
therefore x∗(1) = L and x∗
(
H
µ
)
= H. By continuity, x∗ (α) obtains all values in
[L,H], and note that x∗ (α) = H for α ∈
[
H
µ
, H
L
]
. Given x∗(α) ≡ α · µα, we can
rewrite the indifference condition above as follows: ∀x∗ ∈ [L,H],
ψ0 (x∗) = α ·
(
χ0 · µ+ (1− χ) · x
∗
α
)
= χ0 · µ
µ≤x∗
· x∗ + (1− χ) · x∗ = ψ∗χ0(x∗),
which implies that ψ0(x) = ψ∗χ0(x) – contradicting the assumption that t0 ∈ T\Γ.
5. The “only if” side and the “moreover” statement. Let η0 be a distribution with
supp (η0) ∈ Γ. We prove that η0 is a Nash equilibrium, that all incumbents use
the same threshold strategy, and that each type t′ /∈ Γ is strictly outperformed (i.e,
u (t′, η) < u (t0, η) for each t0 ∈ supp (η0)).
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(a) In Section 3.1 we showed that if all other agents use the “rational” threshold that is
defined by x∗(α) = min
{
α · µ<x∗(α), H
}
, then a type t ∈ Γ also uses x∗(α). Thus,
b∗ = x∗(α) is an equilibrium behavior induced by distribution η0. In what follows
we show that there are no other equilibrium behaviors induced by distribution η0.
(b) Assume to the contrary another equilibrium behavior that induces x¯ (α|η0) 6=
x∗(α):
i. If x¯ (α|η) > α · µα(η0) whenever α · µα(η0) < H then s∗t (α|η0) ≤ x¯ (α|η0) for
each t =
(
χ, ψ∗χ
)
∈ Γ. To see why, assume that α is such that α · µα(η0) < H.
Recall that ψ∗χ is strictly increasing, and that s∗t (α|η0) is the unique solution
to the following equation:
ψ∗χ (s∗t (α|η0)) = α · (χ · µ+ (1− χ) · µα(η0))
< χ · µ
µ≤x¯(α|η0)
· x¯ (α|η0) + (1− χ) · x¯ (α|η0) = ψ∗χ (x¯ (α|η0)) ,
where the strict inequality is implied by x¯ (α|η0) > α · µα(η0) and µα(η0) =
µ≤x¯(α|η0). Since x¯ (α|η) is the average threshold, we get a contradiction.
ii. By an analogous argument, if x¯ (α|η0) < α · µα then s∗t (α|η0) > x¯ (α|η0) for
each t =
(
χ, ψ∗χ
)
∈ Γ, and again we get a contradiction.
iii. Therefore, it must be that x¯ (α|η0) = α · µα whenever α · µα(η0) < H. In
such a case, by an analogous argument, s∗t (α|η0) = x¯ (α|η0) = x∗(α) for each
t =
(
χ, ψ∗χ
)
∈ Γ.
(c) The previous parts imply that if supp (η0) ∈ Γ, then all incumbent types use
threshold strategy x∗(α) and are internally equivalent. Moreover, this threshold
strategy is the optimal one, and this implies that η0 is a Nash equilibrium.
(d) Finally, we can use a similar argument to part (4b) to show that for any α there is a
positive probability of trade, and therefore any type t′ /∈ Γ that uses a non-optimal
threshold for some α’s has a strictly lower payoff than the incumbents.
A.4 Asymptotic Stability of Γ in the Game G0
Prop. 1 in Section 3.2 shows that the set Γ is an internally equivalent and externally strict
set. In this appendix we show why these properties imply that the set of distributions over
Γ is asymptotically stable in the replicator dynamics.
Suppose a dynamic game in which agents are randomly matched each period (two inde-
pendent draws from η) and play the trade game. Agents’ payoffs determine their fitness and
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therefore their frequency in the population in the next stage; that is, the type distribution
η evolves through a payoff-monotone selection dynamics, such as the replicator dynamics
(Taylor & Jonker, 1978). Given Proposition 1, we can rely on existing results to relate the
static equilibria with dynamically stable distributions in such a dynamics. We sketch below
the argument why the set Γ is dynamically stable, and the types outside Γ are unstable.
A distribution of types η is Lyapunov stable if after any sufficiently small invasion by
a mutant distribution of types, the population composition remains close to η in all future
generations.25A set of Lyapunov-stable distributions is asymptotically stable if, after any small
enough invasion by a mutant distribution to any of the distributions in the set, the population
reverts back to the set in the long run. An asymptotically stable set is minimal if no strict
subset is asymptotically stable. For brevity we omit the formal definitions and the formal
arguments, which are quite standard.
Recall that we restrict attention to distributions of types with finite support (both for
incumbents and for mutants), and thus we can apply the result by Nachbar (1990) that
any Lyapunov-stable distribution is a Nash equilibrium. Thomas (1985) defines a notion of
an evolutionarily stable set and shows that it implies asymptotic stability in the replicator
dynamics in a finite strategy space (Cressman, 1997, extends this result to a large set of
payoff-monotone dynamics). Norman (2008, Theorem 1) further extends Thomas’s result to
infinite strategy spaces. Specifically, he shows that if the set of all distributions over a Borel
set is evolutionary stable with a uniform invasion barrier, then it is asymptotically stable.
Let ∆Γ ⊂ ∆ (T ) be the set of distributions over Γ. The fact that Γ is internally equivalent
and externally strict implies that ∆Γ is evolutionarily stable. It is also relatively straightfor-
ward to see that the fully cursed type (1, ψ∗1) ∈ Γ has a uniform invasion barrier (i.e., there
is ¯ > 0 such that the incumbent type (1, ψ∗1) strictly outperforms any mutant type outside
Γ with mass 0 <  < ¯,) and that this invasion barrier also holds for any other distribution
in ∆Γ. Thus, one can adapt the result of Norman (2008) to the current setup and conclude
that the set ∆Γ is asymptotically stable.26 This implies the following corollary of Proposition
1 that characterizes stable distributions in the replicator dynamics.
25We consider only perturbations in which an incumbent population is invaded by a small group of mutants
(that is, we consider only the variational norm when assessing relevant nearby perturbations; see, e.g., Bomze,
1990). We do not consider “continuous” perturbations in which a large group of incumbents slightly change
their types, as in Eshel & Motro (1981). This is because (1) a coordinated change in the type of many
incumbents seems less plausible in our setup, and (2) the existing results on “continuous” stability (e.g.,
Oechssler & Riedel, 2002) hold only when the set of strategies is a subset of R. By contrast, an analysis with
the set of strategies in our population game is intractable.
26Norman (2008) formally deals with strategy spaces that are subsets of Rn, but it seems that all the
arguments in his proof can be extended to the current setup.
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Corollary 1. In game G0 with an underlying replicator dynamics, (1) a distribution η is
Lyapunov stable iff η ∈ ∆Γ, and (2) the set ∆Γ is a minimal asymptotically stable set.
A.5 Formal Definition of Hybrid-Replicator Dynamics
In this section we formalize the definition of the transition function g : ∆(T )→ ∆(T ) that is
described informally in Section 4.2. The relative fitness fη (t) of type t in population η is
fη (t) =
φ+ up (t, η)
φ+ E (up (t, η))
= φ+ up (t, η)
φ+∑t′∈supp(η) η (t′) · up (t′, η) , (10)
where φ ≥ 0 is the background expected number of offspring for an individual (unrelated to
his payoff in the population game). Let Xη and Ψη be the cursedness levels and the perception
biases in population η:
Xη = {χ ∈ [0, 1] | ∃ψ ∈ Ψ s.t. (χ, ψ) ∈ supp (η)} ,
Ψη = {ψ ∈ Ψ | ∃χ ∈ [0, 1] s.t. (χ, ψ) ∈ supp (η)} .
For each χ ∈ Xη (ψ ∈ Ψη) define η (χ) (η (ψ)) as the total frequency of types with χ (ψ):
η (χ) =
∑
ψ∈	η
η ((χ, ψ))
η (ψ) = ∑
χ∈Xη
η ((χ, ψ))
 ,
and define fη (χ) (fη (ψ)) as the mean relative fitness of types with cursedness χ (bias ψ):
fη (χ) = E (fη ((χ, ψ)) |ψ ∈ Ψη) =
∑
ψ∈	η
η ((χ, ψ))
η (χ) · fη ((χ, ψ))
fη (ψ) = E (fη ((χ, ψ)) |χ ∈ Xη) = ∑
χ∈Xη
η ((χ, ψ))
η (ψ) · fη ((χ, ψ))
 .
Lastly, (for every (χ, ψ) ∈ Xη ×Ψη, the transition function is
g (η) ((χ, ψ)) = (1− r) · η ((χ, ψ)) · fη ((χ, ψ)) + r · η (χ) · fη (χ) · η (ψ) · fη (ψ) .
A.6 Lemma on Stability of Types in Hybrid-Replicator Dynamics
In what follows, we prove a lemma that characterizes stability in hybrid-replicator dynamics,
and that is used in the proof of Propositions 2 and 4. The lemma shows that an incum-
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bent type is asymptotically stable against a mutant type if: (1) the mutant’s payoff is not
substantially higher than the incumbent’s payoff (specifically, the mutant’s fitness should be
less than 11−r times the incumbent’s fitness); and (2) the hybrid types (who have one trait
of type t and one trait of type t′) yield lower payoffs than the incumbent. The lemma is an
adaptation of Prop. 2 of Waldman (1994) to the current strategic setup in which the payoff
of a type depends also on the population. Parts (2)–(3) of the lemma show that being a
single-bias Nash equilibrium is a necessary condition for a type to be asymptotically stable.
Part (4) of the lemma implies that being a strict Nash equilibrium is a sufficient condition
for asymptotic stability.
Lemma 2 (Characterization of Stability in Hybrid-Replicator Dynamics). Let t1 = (χ1, ψ1)
and t2 = (χ2, ψ2) denote some arbitrary types. Assume a population game Gp with a hybrid-
replicator dynamics with parameters φ and r, and let up(t, η) and fη(t) be the expected payoff
and the relative fitness of type t against population η as defined in (3) and (10).
1. If (1− r) · ft1 (t2) > 1, then type t1 is not asymptotically stable against t2.
2. If up ((χ2, ψ1) , t1) > up (t1, t1), then type t1 is not asymptotically stable against (χ2, ψ1).
3. If up ((χ1, ψ2) , t1) > up (t1, t1), then type t1 is not asymptotically stable against (χ1, ψ2).
4. If (a) (1− r)·ft1 (t2) < ft1 (t1), (b) up ((χ2, ψ1) , t1) < up (t1, t1), and (c) up ((χ1, ψ2) , t1) <
up (t1, t1), then type t1 is asymptotically stable against t2.
Proof. Let  > 0 be sufficiently small, and let the initial distribution be: η0 = (1− )·t1+·t2.
Part (1). Assume that (1− r) ·ft1 (t2) = c > 1. By neglecting components that are O (2),
Eq. (4) implies that gτ (η0) (t2) ≈  · ((1− r) · ft1 (t2))τ =  · cτ and this implies instability of
t1 against t2.
Parts (2)–(3) are immediately implied by well-known results for the replicator dynamics
and the observation that when the population includes a single cursedness level (or a single
perception bias), then the hybrid-replicator dynamics coincides with a replicator dynamics.
Part (4). Assume inequalities (a)–(c). Inequalities (b) and (c) imply ft1 ((χ2, ψ1)) < 1
and ft1 ((χ1, ψ2)) < 1. Define a constant c such that
max {(1− r) · ft1 (t2) , ft1 ((χ2, ψ1)) , ft1 ((χ1, ψ2))} < c < 1.
Let ητ = gτ (η0) be the distribution after τ generations. By neglecting components that are
O (2), Eq. (4) implies that for every τ in which ητ ((χ1, ψ2)) and ητ ((χ2, ψ1)) are O ():
ητ (t2) ≈  · cτ , which converges to 0 at an exponential rate. Assume to the contrary, that
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ητ ((χ1, ψ2)) does not converge to zero at an exponential rate. Then, for a sufficiently large
τ , ητ (t2)  ητ ((χ1, ψ2)). The average relative fitness of all types with ψ = ψ2, fητ (ψ2),
is a mixed average of fητ ((χ1, ψ2)) and fητ (t2), and as the weight of the latter converges
quickly to zero, the average converges to the former, that is, fητ (ψ2) ≈ fητ ((χ1, ψ2)) . Let
′ = ητ ((χ1, ψ2)). We obtain that
ητ+1 ((χ1, ψ2)) ≈ (1− r) · ′ · fητ ((χ1, ψ2)) + r · ′ · fητ (ψ2) ≈ ′ · fητ ((χ1, ψ2)) < ′ · c,
which implies that ητ ((χ1, ψ2)) converges to zero at an exponential rate. An analogous
argument works for (χ2, ψ1).
A.7 Proof of Prop. 2 (Only (0, I) is Asymptotically Stable)
1. Let t = (χ, ψ) 6= (0, I). Parts (2–3) of Lemma 2 imply that a single-bias Nash equilib-
rium is a necessary condition for asymptotic stability. In what follows, we prove that
there is p¯ > 0 such that type t is not a single-bias Nash equilibrium for any p ∈ (0, p¯).
We deal with two separate cases: (a) t /∈ Γ, and (b) t ∈ Γ.
(a) Assume that t /∈ Γ. This assumption implies that type t does not choose the
optimal threshold against itself in the barter trade (by the same argument as in
the proof of Prop. 1). Observe that the optimal (i.e., payoff-maximizing) strategy
against a population of agents of type t is sBR(t) (α) = α · µ≤b(t)(α). Define ψBR(t|χ)
as the perception that chooses the optimal thresholds given cursedness χ and a
population of t-agents, i.e., ψBR(t|χ) satisfies for each α ∈
[
1, H
L
]
:
ψBR(t|χ)
(
α · µ≤b∗t (t)(α)
)
= α ·
(
χ · µ+ (1− χ) · µ≤b∗t (t)(α)
)
.
By Lemma 1, the conditional expectation µ≤b(t)(α) is strictly increasing and contin-
uous in α, which implies there exists a strictly increasing and continuous ψBR(t|χ)
that satisfies these equations, and it is uniquely defined for each x ≥ µ≤b(t)(1). If
µ≤b(t)(1) > L, then we still have to define ψBR(t|χ) (x) for lower values of x. Any
strictly increasing continuous function will do, but for concreteness we choose the
following linear definition: ψBR(t|χ) (L) = L, and for each x ∈
(
L, µ≤b(t)(1)
)
:
ψBR(t|χ) (x) = L+
x− L
µ≤b∗t (t)(1) − L
·
(
χ · µ+ (1− χ) · µ≤b∗t (t)(1)
)
.
The fact that BR (t) =
(
χ, ψBR(t|χ)
)
chooses the optimal thresholds against t
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implies that u0 (BR (t) , t) > u0 (t, t). This implies that there is p¯ > 0 such that
for each p ≤ p¯ up (BR (t) , t) > up (t, t), which shows that type t is not a single-bias
Nash equilibrium. Part (3) of Lemma 2 implies that type t is not asymptotically
stable.
(b) Assume that t ∈ Γ. This assumption implies that an agent of type t chooses the
optimal threshold against a population of t-players (by the arguments in the proof
of Prop. 1). Let χ′ = χ−  for 0 <  1. Observe that type t′ = (χ′, ψ) chooses
almost the same thresholds as type t, i.e., for each α ∈
[
1, H
L
]
:
b∗t (t′) (α) = b∗t (t) (α) +O () = sopt(t) (α) +O () .
Observe that for each α the decision of an agent of type t′ (against a population of
t-agents) is optimal in most cases, except for those in which the agent’s value is in
the small interval of size O () between b∗t (t′) (α) and b∗t (t) (α), and in this case the
expected loss is bounded by O (). This implies that the payoff of type t′ is only
O (2) away from the payoff of type t in the barter trade, i.e., u0 (t′, t) ≥ u0 (t, t)−
O (2). On the other hand, type t′ earns a higher payoff of ∂v
∂χ
(χ) ·O () +O (2) in
the additional activities (with ∂v
∂χ
(χ) > 0). This implies that for each p > 0, there
is a sufficiently small 0 <   p such that up (t′, t) > up (t, t), which shows that
type t is not a single-bias Nash equilibrium.
2. Let t′ = (χ′, ψ′). The fact that type (0, I) makes optimal decisions in the barter trade
and achieves the best payoff in v implies that for each p > 0 and each distribution of
types in the population η, up ((0, I) , η) > up (t′, η). In particular, it implies that (I, 0)
is a strict Nash equilibrium. Part (4) of Lemma 2 implies that (0, I) is asymptotically
stable.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 3 (Global Fast Convergence to Γ)
Let t = (χ, ψ) /∈ Γ. Recall the definition of BR (t) in the proof of Prop. 2 above. Let
tΓ = (χ, ψχ) ∈ Γ be the element in Γ with the same level of cursedness as t. The proof
includes the following steps.
1. We begin by showing that the perception bias of BR (t) is strictly between t and tΓ.
Specifically, we show that for each α ∈
[
1, H
L
]
, the threshold chosen by type BR (t) is
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between the thresholds chosen by types t and tΓ, i.e.,
b∗t (BR (t)) (α) = b∗t (t) (α) ⇒ b∗t (tΓ) (α) = b∗t (t) (α) ,
b∗t (BR (t)) (α) < b∗t (t) (α) ⇒ b∗t (BR (t)) (α) ∈ (b∗t (tΓ) (α) , b∗t (t) (α)) , and
b∗t (BR (t)) (α) > b∗t (t) (α) ⇒ b∗t (BR (t)) (α) ∈ (b∗t (t) (α) , b∗t (tΓ) (α)) .
If b∗t (BR (t)) (α) = b∗t (t) (α), then it implies that type t chooses the optimal threshold
against itself given α. Recall (see Section 3.1) that ψχ is defined to choose the optimal
threshold against a population of agents who choose the optimal threshold (henceforth,
an as-if rational population). This implies that b∗t (tΓ) (α) = b∗t (t) (α). Next, assume
that b∗t (BR (t)) (α) < b∗t (t) (α) (b∗t (BR (t)) (α) > b∗t (t) (α)). This implies that agents
of type t choose a threshold that is too high (low) against a population of t-agents,
and the expected value of a good conditional on trade (µ≤b∗t (t)(α)) is greater (less) than
the expected value of a traded good in a population of agents who choose the opti-
mal threshold. Agents of type tΓ choose the optimal threshold against as-if rational
populations. Against a population of agents who choose a threshold that is too high
(low), such as a population of types t, these types will choose a threshold that is too
low (high), that is, b∗t (tΓ) (α) < b∗t (BR (t)) (α) (b∗t (tΓ) (α) > b∗t (BR (t)) (α)).
2. Next we show that type BR (t) eliminates type t. We have to show that type BR (t)
achieves a strictly higher payoff than type t in population q ·BR (t) + (1− q) · t for any
q ∈ (0, 1), which implies that type BR (t) eliminates t because the hybrid-replicator
dynamics is payoff monotone when all agents have the same level of cursedness. Fix
α ∈
[
1, H
L
]
. Assume that b∗t (BR (t)) (α) < b∗t (t) (α) (b∗t (BR (t)) (α) > b∗t (t) (α)). This
implies that agents of type BR (t) choose a lower (higher) thresholds than agents of
type t. Recall that an agent of type BR (t) chooses an optimal threshold against a
population of agents of type t. Therefore, by a similar argument to that in the previous
step, type BR(t) chooses a threshold that is too high (low) against a mixed population
q ·BR (t) + (1− q) · t. But, this implies that the optimal threshold (for the given α) in
the mixed population is strictly closer to the threshold used by type BR (t) than to the
threshold used by type t. Thus, agents of type BR (t) make smaller mistakes in their
thresholds for all values of α, and achieve a strictly higher payoff in the barter trade
than that of the agents of type t in the mixed population. For a sufficiently low p, the
same holds also in the game up.
3. The distance ‖t−BR (t)‖ measures how much an agent of type t chooses wrong thresh-
olds against a population of t-agents. The arguments in the proof of Prop. 1 imply
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that ‖t−BR (t)‖ = 0 iff t ∈ Γ, and relatively simple adaptations of these arguments
show that if t /∈ Γδ, then there is  = O (δ) such that ‖t−BR (t)‖ > . The fact that
BR (t) is strictly between t and tΓ (as shown in part (1) above) implies that
‖tΓ −BR (t)‖ = ‖tΓ − t‖ − ‖t−BR (t)‖ < ‖tΓ − t‖ − .
A.9 Proof of Prop. 4 (Slow Drift within Γ)
Let p∗ ∈ (0, 1) be sufficiently small such that(1− r) ·up ((0, I) , t) < up (t, t) for each t ∈ Γ and
each p ≤ p∗ (such p∗ > 0 exists due to the fact that u0 ((0, I) , t) = u0 (t, t), r > 0, and the
Lipschitz continuity of the function v (t, η). Without loss of generality we can assume that
p¯ < p∗ (as, otherwise, we can choose a sufficiently large  such that part (1) holds trivially,
and the proof of part (2) is unaffected by taking a large ).
1. Fix a sufficiently small δ¯  p¯, r, such that (1− r) · up∗ ((0, I) , t) < up (t, t) for each
t ∈ Γδ¯ and each p ≤ p∗. Let t = (χ, ψ) ∈ Γδ¯. Observe that for each  > 0, if t′ = (χ′, ψ′)
is a type such that |χ′ − χ| , ‖ψ − ψ′‖ > , then both hybrid types (χ, ψ′) and (χ′, ψ)
have thresholds that differ substantially (i.e., by more than O ()) from the optimal
thresholds against a population of agents of type t. This implies that there is λ = O ()
such that u0 (t, t) > u0 ((χ, ψ′) , t) + λ and u0 (t, t) > u0 ((χ′, ψ) , t) + λ. This, in turn,
implies (by the Lipschitz continuity of the payoff function of the additional activities v)
that there is  = O (p¯) such that for each p ∈ (0, p¯) and each type t′ = (χ′, ψ′) satisfying
|χ′ − χ| , ‖ψ − ψ′‖ >  the following inequalities hold: up (t, t) > up ((χ, ψ′) , t) and
up (t, t) > up ((χ′, ψ) , t). These inequalities imply, due to Part (4) of Lemma 2, that
type t is asymptotically stable against type t′.
Next, consider a sequence (t0 = t, t1, ..., tn = (I, 0)) that satisfies that each type ti+1
eliminates type ti. The above argument implies that the distance between each two
successive elements must be at most  = O (p¯). This, in turn, implies the following
minimal bound on the length of the sequence:
n ≥ ‖t‖

= ‖t‖ · Ω
(
1
p¯
)
,
and, in particular, the RHS converges to infinity as p¯→ 0.
2. Fix p ∈ (0, p¯) (where p¯ is defined as above). Let 0 < δ, α  p. Let t = (χ, ψ) ∈
Γδ \ {(0, I)}. Let λ = max (α, ‖Γ− t‖). Let t′ = (χ′, ψ) be a type with the same
perception bias and a slightly lower level of cursedness, i.e., χ− λ < χ′ < χ . Consider
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any mixed population ηq = q · t′+ (1− q) · t. Observe that in any such population both
types choose almost the same thresholds for each α ∈
[
1, H
L
]
:
b∗ηq (t
′) (α) = b∗ηq (t) (α) +O (λ) ,
and that these thresholds are almost optimal (because the thresholds of type t are almost
optimal in a population of agents of type t). A similar “envelope-theorem” argument
as in the proof of part 1(b) of Prop. 2 implies that the expected loss of type t′ in the
barter trade is bounded by O (λ2) , i.e., u0 (t′, t) ≥ u0 (t, t)−O (λ2). On the other hand,
type t′ earns a strictly higher payoff of ∂v
∂χ
(χ) · O (λ) in the additional activities. This
implies that up (t′, η) > up (t, η) for a sufficiently small λ, which implies that type t′
eliminates type t (as the hybrid-replicator dynamics is payoff monotone if all agents
have the same perception bias).
Remark 4. The proof above eliminates type t by a mutant with a slightly lower level of
cursedness. The same argument can be adapted to show elimination by a mutant type with
a slightly smaller endowment effect.
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